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Informed 
Consent, Body 
Property, and 
Self-Sovereignty
Radhika Rao
Research using human biological materials is booming, yet many questions regarding such research remain unanswered. Is informed 
consent always necessary for the use of human bio-
logical materials in research, and if so, what counts as 
informed consent? Is a generalized blanket consent 
to all future research sufficient, or must the donors of 
biological specimens be provided with full information 
about the purposes of the research and affirmatively 
consent to each particular use? What about property 
rights — does the donor “own” his or her biological 
specimen and have a right to control its use? And if 
such research leads to patents and commercialization, 
does the donor have a right to share in any resulting 
profits? Even if donors do not possess property rights, 
what about the potential impact of such research upon 
the donor’s (and his or her family’s) right to privacy? 
Are there special concerns regarding research using 
vulnerable populations, such as newborn babies, 
indigenous tribes, and others groups who may lack 
knowledge and power? 
In 2010, a book about an African-American woman 
whose cancer cells were taken without her knowledge 
or consent to create a valuable cell line became a best-
seller.1 Henrietta Lacks, a poor black woman from a 
family of tobacco farmers, supplied the cells which 
became the first immortal cell line — the HeLa line. 
HeLa cells ended up in labs across the country, were 
sent to the moon, led to development of the polio 
vaccine, improved our understanding of cancer, and 
helped pave the way for modern advances in in vitro 
fertilization, genetics, and cloning. Yet Henrietta 
Lacks’ contributions to science were seldom acknowl-
edged,2 except by the name given to the cell line, and 
many in her family remain too poor to afford health 
care. Rebecca Skloot, the author of The Immortal Life 
of Henrietta Lacks, captures the issue beautifully: 
How you should feel about all this isn’t obvious. 
Scientists aren’t stealing your arm or some vital 
organ. They’re just using tissue scraps you parted 
with voluntarily. But still, someone is taking part 
of you. And people often have a strong sense of 
ownership when it comes to their bodies. Even 
tiny scraps of it. Especially when they hear that 
someone else might be making money off those 
scraps. Or using them to uncover potentially 
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damaging information about their genes and 
medical histories.3
In 2013, researchers published the genome of the HeLa 
cell line on open-access databases without obtaining 
consent from the family of Henrietta Lacks, provok-
ing yet another controversy because the gene sequence 
could reveal certain heritable aspects of Lacks’ DNA, 
and thus be used to draw inferences about her descen-
dants.4 Henrietta Lacks’ history captivated the public 
imagination. Her story also encapsulates the contro-
versy over informed consent, and hints at a possible 
resolution through the rubric of body property. 
Henrietta Lacks’ cells were taken at a time when 
there were no rules requiring informed consent for 
research using human subjects or human biological 
materials. In 1981, the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services enacted regulations for the protec-
tion of human subjects, known as the “Common Rule,” 
which establish the standard governing research that 
is supported by the federal government.5 The Com-
mon Rule applies to all research involving human 
subjects that is conducted, supported, or otherwise 
subject to regulation by any federal department or 
agency. Under the Common Rule, a researcher must 
provide the research subject with information about 
the potential risks and benefits of participating in 
research, and must obtain informed consent. But the 
Common Rule was developed for “research on living, 
breathing humans, not their disembodied tissues.”6 
Thus, it applies only to research obtained through 
direct interaction with a living, breathing human 
being, and to human biological specimens that involve 
identifiable private information. However, the Com-
mon Rule does not apply if the research is not feder-
ally funded, if the human subject is deceased, or if the 
biological specimens are de-identified, anonymous, or 
publicly available.7
In September 2015, the U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services announced proposed revisions 
to the Common Rule, through a Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking (NPRM). The proposed revisions seek to 
expand the definition of “human subject” to encompass 
human biological materials, regardless of whether the 
biospecimens contain identifiable information. Yet 
this requirement would apply only prospectively, and 
would be delayed in its implementation until three 
years after publication of the final rule. And even if 
the proposed regulations succeed in expanding the 
scope of “human subject” under the Common Rule to 
incorporate biological specimens, it does not necessar-
ily follow that the doctrine of informed consent would 
provide sufficient protection for the donors of biologi-
cal materials. The proposed revisions would require 
only a one-time broad consent for the secondary use 
of human biological materials, meaning 
the use of biospecimens for a purpose 
different from the purpose for which the 
biospecimen was originally collected (for 
example, research use of tissue samples 
initially collected for clinical care). Such 
blanket consent is inadequate to fulfill 
the promise of informed consent.
The true challenge of informed con-
sent is that this venerable doctrine often 
functions as a charade, a collective fiction 
which thinly masks the uncomfortable fact that the 
subjects of human research are not actually afforded 
full information regarding the types of research that 
may be contemplated, nor do they provide meaning-
ful consent. The elaborate bureaucratic formalities by 
means of which patients seeking medical treatment 
check off a series of boxes on a multitude of forms are 
not a substitute for genuine informed consent. Cur-
rently, there are various degrees of consent, which 
range from: (1) consent as merely the absence of coer-
cion, such as when human biological materials are 
obtained through a voluntary transfer; (2) presumed 
consent based upon the failure to opt-out; and (3) 
actual affirmative consent. If affirmative consent is 
construed to encompass blanket consent, it gives the 
subjects of human research only the ability to say “yes” 
or “no,” rather than providing them with a full array 
of options and granting them the power to authorize 
particularized consent to some uses, while withhold-
ing consent from other uses. Yet if informed consent 
actually required the provision of complete informa-
tion, and mandated particularized consent to each 
type of research use, it would most probably be admin-
istratively unworkable.8 Indeed, underlying many of 
the judicial decisions in this area is the fear that the 
administrative burdens of obtaining consent would 
impede socially valuable research.9 Furthermore, 
particularized consent might also result in informa-
tion overload, and ultimately diminish or even destroy 
Henrietta Lacks’ history captivated the public 
imagination. Her story also encapsulates the 
controversy over informed consent, and hints 
at a possible resolution through the rubric of 
body property. 
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choice. Confronted with a mass of complicated infor-
mation and a complete menu of options, individuals 
are likely to feel overwhelmed, unable to adequately 
process the information and choose the appropriate 
course of action.10 Thus, informed consent inevitably 
requires a choice between whether to provide too little 
or too much information.
The Havasupai Tribe’s experience with Arizona 
State University vividly illustrates the limits of 
informed consent, as Deborah Zoe Laufer brilliantly 
reveals in her play on the subject.11 Starting in 1990, 
members of the Havasupai Tribe voluntarily gave 
blood samples to researchers at Arizona State Uni-
versity in order to determine whether there was a 
genetic basis for the high rate of diabetes among tribe 
members. The researchers sought but ultimately did 
not find a genetic link to diabetes. However, they also 
used the stored blood samples to conduct other stud-
ies on schizophrenia, the degree of inbreeding, and the 
geographical origins of the tribe, even though these 
investigations threatened the Tribe’s cultural and 
religious values. One of the published papers based 
upon research using the blood samples reported a 
high degree of inbreeding within the tribe, which 
tribe members found offensive. According to Carletta 
Tilousi, a member of the Havasupai tribal council, 
“We say if you do that, a close relative of yours will 
die.”12 And another article suggested that the tribe’s 
ancestors had migrated from Asia across the frozen 
Bering Sea to arrive in North America, which contra-
dicted the tribe’s traditional religious belief that it had 
originated in the Grand Canyon. Members of the tribe 
even feared that they had unwittingly contributed to 
research that could undermine their right to tribal 
land: “Our coming from the canyon, that is the basis 
of our sovereign rights,” stated Edmond Tilousi, the 
Tribe’s vice-chairman.13
In 2005, Carletta Tilousi and the Havasupai Tribe 
filed a lawsuit against the researchers and Arizona 
State University in federal district court.14 The plain-
tiffs alleged eight counts of wrongdoing: (1) breach of 
fiduciary duty and lack of informed consent; (2) fraud, 
misrepresentation, and fraudulent concealment; (3) 
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress; (4) conversion; (5) violation of civil rights; (6) 
negligence, gross negligence, and negligence per se; 
(7) unreasonable disclosure of private facts; and (8) 
intentional intrusion upon seclusion. In their first 
claim for lack of informed consent, the plaintiffs con-
tended that they donated biological materials solely 
for the purpose of diabetes research, so there was no 
consent to conduct other research. As Carletta Tilousi, 
a member of the Havasupai tribal council, explained, 
“I’m not against scientific research. I just want it to be 
done right. They used our blood for all these studies, 
people got degrees and grants, and they never asked 
our permission.”15 But the court ruled that there was 
informed consent because the tribe members had 
agreed to give their blood voluntarily, and had signed 
a form granting blanket consent for research “to study 
the causes of behavioral/medical disorders.”16 The 
court concluded that their consent was not vitiated by 
fraud: “Plaintiffs consented to having blood drawn and 
were fully aware of the character of the contact. Thus 
their consent is not made ineffective even if defen-
dants did make fraudulent representations to induce 
that consent.”17 At best, the Havasupai case holds that 
blanket consent is sufficient to satisfy the standard 
of informed consent. At worst, the case suggests that 
consent exists so long as there was no coercion and 
the transfer of biological materials was voluntary, even 
if researchers made misrepresentations regarding the 
purpose of the research. 
 The Havasupai case exposes the emptiness of 
informed consent, for a form that permits research in 
order to study “the causes of behavioral/medical disor-
ders” is so vague and broad as to be virtually meaning-
less. The tribe members’ consent to diabetes research 
clearly did not encompass other types of research, 
especially research offensive to their religious and 
cultural values. The researcher who performed this 
research, Therese Markow, now a professor at the 
University of California, San Diego, declared, “I was 
doing good science.”18 She defended her actions as eth-
ical, suggesting that the very notion of particularized 
consent stems from a failure to understand the fun-
damental nature of genetic research, where progress 
often occurs from studies that do not appear to bear 
directly on a particular disease.19 She explained that 
the consent form was purposefully simple because 
English was a second language for many Havasupai, 
and few of the tribe’s 650 members had graduated 
from high school.20 Under such conditions, a more 
comprehensive consent form, providing complete 
information and requiring particularized consent for 
each type of research use would not necessarily be 
better. Indeed, as the Havasupai experience reveals, 
the entire enterprise of informed consent is fraught 
with the potential for miscommunication and cultural 
misunderstanding, and undermined by its inability to 
protect those who lack knowledge and power. 
Although the Havasupai Tribe lost the legal battle 
because the court dismissed all of its claims, it was 
morally vindicated in April 2010, when Arizona State 
University (ASU) agreed to a settlement to “remedy the 
wrong that was done.”21 ASU agreed to pay $700,000 
to 41 members of the Tribe, return the remaining 
blood samples, and provide other forms of assistance 
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to the Tribe, such as scholarships and help in setting 
up a clinic.22 In spite of this moral victory, the legal 
opinions in the case demonstrate the inadequacy of 
informed consent to articulate and render actionable 
claims of cultural and dignitary harms.23
If the doctrine of informed consent fails to provide 
adequate protection to the subjects of human research 
who donate biological materials, why not turn to the 
language of property law? Property is power, as the 
legal realist Morris Cohen recognized long ago. In his 
classic article on the connection between property 
and sovereignty, Cohen warned, “We must not over-
look the actual fact that dominion over things is also 
imperium over our fellow human beings.”24 Yet cur-
rent law permits everyone except for those who donate 
human biological materials to possess property rights. 
The reluctance to invoke property law probably stems 
from fears of resurrecting slavery and the commodifi-
cation of human beings.25 But ironically, the avoidance 
of property transforms the subjects of human research 
into objects of property that can be owned only by oth-
ers, resulting in new forms of oppression and exploi-
tation. Human research subjects are autonomous 
individuals who should not only possess the power to 
contribute their biological materials, but also the right 
to help control the course of research, and to share in 
the resulting benefits or profits. Conferring body prop-
erty might enable research subjects to regain power 
and a measure of self-sovereignty.
Newborn blood screening programs also illustrate 
the ambiguity of informed consent, and exemplify 
inconsistent attitudes towards body property. In every 
state, blood spots are routinely collected from new-
born babies in order to detect and treat a variety of 
genetic diseases, often without the parents’ knowledge 
or consent. However, Texas and some other states 
started to store these blood samples indefinitely and 
made them available to others for research use. A 
group of Texas parents sued the state health agency for 
violating their rights to privacy and liberty under the 
Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment, arguing 
that the blood spots contained deeply private medi-
cal and genetic information that was expropriated 
without their knowledge or consent, and a federal dis-
trict court refused to dismiss their complaint.26 This 
resulted in a new law in Texas requiring parents to be 
given the opportunity to opt-out of such research, as 
well as a settlement agreement which gave the state 70 
days to destroy approximately 5 million blood samples 
collected from newborn babies over the past 7 years. 
Thus, the Texas case resulted in a law that presumes 
parental consent unless parents exercise their oppor-
tunity to opt-out of newborn screening. In a similar 
lawsuit in Minnesota, the state Supreme Court ruled 
that the state’s dissemination and use of newborn dried 
blood samples for research without obtaining written 
informed consent violated its Genetic Privacy Act.27 
Despite these “Baby DNA lawsuits,” informed con-
sent for newborn screening varies widely from state to 
state.28 Many states do not even notify parents about 
potential research use of newborn dried blood sam-
ples or give them the opportunity to opt-out, let alone 
require actual affirmative consent. In 4 states, dried 
blood samples are conceptualized as the property of 
the state, and in 10 states, the Department of Health is 
granted authority over the use of dried blood samples, 
although it is unclear who retains ownership.29 
In all of these contexts, the legal status of the human 
body remains hotly contested. Sometimes human bod-
ies and body parts are classified as objects of property, 
while at other times they are characterized as the sub-
ject of privacy rights to be protected under informed 
consent doctrine, and some are even endowed with 
dignity and afforded the status of persons.30 This is 
true not only for different types of human tissue; dis-
parate treatment may be accorded the same body part 
in different contexts. Thus, the body may be deemed 
property for some people but not others, and it may 
be treated as property in some contexts but not others. 
For example, under California law, human eggs may 
be purchased and sold for fertility treatments but not 
for purposes of research.31 
There are three important cases in which individu-
als have claimed ownership of their own bodies in the 
context of biomedical research. In all three cases, the 
courts refused to accord property rights to those who 
supply body parts for medical research, although the 
same courts were willing to recognize the property 
rights of other persons in the body parts themselves 
and the resulting products. Almost every student of 
property law is familiar with the first case, Moore v. 
Regents of the University of California,32 in which the 
California Supreme Court ruled that Moore’s spleen 
was not his property. At the same time, the court 
found that the Mo cell line — which had been cre-
ated from Moore’s spleen cells and, ironically, named 
after him — was the property of the researchers who 
had been granted a patent upon it. But Greenberg v. 
Miami Children’s Hospital goes one step further than 
Moore by holding not only that the blood, tissue, and 
other body parts that the Greenbergs had supplied to 
researchers were not their property, but also that the 
gene responsible for their disease was the property 
of the scientists who isolated it and the hospital that 
patented it, rather than the persons in whose bodies 
it remained.33 And Washington University v. Cata-
lona34 goes far beyond both Moore and Greenberg by 
making explicit what was only implicit in those cases. 
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In Catalona, the court concluded that not just intel-
lectual property in the body but also tangible physical 
parts of the body (such as blood and tissue samples) 
were owned by the university that stored them in its 
Genito-Urinary Biorepository; thus, they were not 
owned by the patients from whose bodies these bio-
logical materials had been derived.35 
Why is the law willing to confer property rights 
upon some while denying the same rights to others? 
At first glance, the lopsided treatment of the human 
body seems to stem from the distinction between 
physical body parts and intellectual property in the 
body. Specifically, body parts are seen as a form of 
raw material to be harvested, whereas cell lines and 
certain categories of human genes are conceptual-
ized as a kind of man-made technology.36 Hence, 
the “inventor” of intellectual property in the body is 
granted broad protection that extends across space 
and time, whereas bodily property is conceived as 
a tangible thing that is protected only insofar as it 
remains in the possession of its “owner,” or that may 
be deemed un-ownable and thus not protected at all. 
But even physical body parts may receive property 
protection when they are in the possession of a uni-
versity or scientist rather than an ordinary person, 
which suggests that the divergence lies deeper than 
a distinction between tangible body parts and intel-
lectual property in the body.
Despite the disavowal of property terminology, 
property concepts are so pervasive and powerful that 
they continue to creep back into the doctrine and the 
discourse. In January 2015, for example, a tax court 
for the first time addressed the question whether pay-
ments received by women for the “donation” of their 
eggs constitute taxable income. The court ruled that 
women must pay tax on the proceeds from egg sales.37 
More recently, several women have filed a lawsuit 
challenging limits on the amount of compensation for 
egg donors implemented by fertility clinics; the plain-
tiffs contend that these limits constitute price-fixing 
in violation of the antitrust laws.38 But if the IRS may 
tax payments to egg sources, and if fertility clinics and 
physicians may reap huge profits from the reproduc-
tive enterprise, why should only the women who sup-
ply eggs be prevented from treating them as property, 
subject to market pricing? 
Rejection of property is generally justified by a 
paternalistic desire to protect the sources of biological 
materials, stemming from fears that commodification 
of the human body could lead to coercion or exploita-
tion of vulnerable persons, such as women who donate 
their eggs. But ironically, failure to treat the body as 
property may actually result in a lack of protection 
against the misuse of body parts and enable wrong-
doing. This is evident in the egg-stealing scandal that 
erupted at UC Irvine in 1995. At the time, prosecutors 
were unable to press charges against the physicians 
who misappropriated eggs without the knowledge or 
consent of women seeking fertility treatments, and 
gave them to other patients. Prosecutors were unable 
to prosecute for grand theft, which is defined as the 
taking of personal property valued at more than $400, 
because it was unclear whether human eggs constitute 
“property” under the California precedent of Moore v. 
Regents of the University of California. Yet the pros-
ecutors could not prosecute for kidnapping, either, 
because human eggs and embryos clearly do not con-
stitute persons under California law. In response to 
this scandal, lawmakers were forced to enact new leg-
islation which made the theft of human eggs a crime 
and authorized fines of up to $50,000 or penalties of 
up to 5 years in prison for the intentional transfer of 
human sperm, eggs, or embryos without the written 
consent of donors and recipients.39
Moreover, rejection of property in human biologi-
cal materials does not actually prevent commodifica-
tion and commercialization of the body. The research-
ers who invest intellectual capital and the companies 
and universities that invest financial capital are per-
mitted to reap profits from human research, so why 
not those who provide the human capital in the form 
of their own bodies? If the concern is commodifica-
tion and commercialization, why should everyone but 
the donor possess property rights and be permitted 
to share in the profits from human research? Such 
a lopsided system appears to demand altruism from 
the subjects of human research, while enabling every-
one but the person who donated the raw materials to 
Why is the law willing to confer property rights upon some while denying  
the same rights to others? At first glance, the lopsided treatment of the 
human body seems to stem from the distinction between physical  
body parts and intellectual property in the body.
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commodify, commercialize, and ultimately profit from 
human biological materials. Henrietta Lacks’ daugh-
ter, Deborah, criticizes the asymmetric altruism which 
underlies the lack of bodily property, saying, “But I 
always have thought it was strange, if our mother cells 
done so much for medicine, how come her family can’t 
afford to see no doctors? Don’t make no sense. People 
got rich off my mother without us even knowin’ about 
them takin her cells, now we don’t get a dime.”40 
Such expectations of asymmetric altruism appear 
even more troubling when imposed in ways that 
reflect and reinforce underlying racial, gender, and 
other hierarchies. For example, inconsistent attitudes 
towards the compensation of sperm and egg donors 
may embody an assumption that egg donations should 
result from pure altruism, rather than self-interest.41 
To the extent that such assumptions are invoked when 
women are providing material that is intertwined with 
reproduction, they may stem from deep-seated stereo-
types regarding the natural role of women as altruistic 
and the natural sphere of woman as the family, which 
should be kept separate from the market. The use of 
African-Americans and other minority groups, Native 
American tribes, such as the Havasupai, and newborn 
babies in human research also raises such concerns.
If the rejection of property is problematic, why not 
embrace property? In his influential Commentaries, 
William Blackstone portrayed property as the “sole 
and despotic dominion which one man claims and 
exercises over the external things of the world, in total 
exclusion of the right of any other individual in the 
universe.”42 Despite this pervasive image, property 
does not necessitate Blackstone’s vision of an absolute 
and individual right.43 Instead, according to Hohfeld-
ian theory, property is conceptualized as a bundle of 
rights, so property need not be all or nothing. Indi-
viduals need not possess every stick in the bundle 
of rights: they may have the right to possess and the 
right to exclude others, but not the right to buy, sell, or 
destroy. Moreover, the concept of property as a bundle 
of rights means that it is possible to disaggregate the 
various sticks in the bundle and apportion them to 
different parties. Hence, different sticks in the bundle 
of rights with respect to biological materials could be 
allocated to different individuals, or even shared by a 
family, a group, or the public collectively. 
Property provides a powerful framework that is 
capable of addressing the manifold attributes of human 
biological materials. First, human biological materi-
als are not just physical objects; they also incorporate 
genetic information. Property encompasses the dual 
character of biological materials as tangible things as 
well as intellectual property.44 Moreover, biological 
materials may undergo multiple transfers and end up 
in the hands of those who possess no connection to 
the donor. Property rights provide ongoing protection 
because they are in rem, meaning that they run with the 
object or thing and are enforceable against the whole 
world, unlike contractual rights, which are in perso-
nam, meaning that they bind only the parties to the 
agreement or contract. In addition, property provides 
a mechanism that is able to mediate conflicts not just 
against the government and outsiders (who are non-
owners), but also among multiple owners of a valu-
able resource. The framework of property is perfectly 
designed to accommodate shared interests among 
multiple owners of a resource because property can be 
distributed between many owners simultaneously, and 
it can also be divided over time, with current interests 
belonging to some individuals and future interests to 
others. Indeed, property is conceptualized as a bundle 
of rights, so that different sticks in the bundle may be 
disentangled and allocated to different persons. Thus, 
some persons may possess the right to exclude, while 
others may possess the right to use or to transfer to oth-
ers. Finally, property offers a variety of flexible forms 
to accommodate different types of shared ownership 
interests, including the trust, which divides legal and 
equitable title; joint tenancy, tenancy in common, and 
tenancy by the entirety; the partnership and the cor-
poration; as well as a variety of intellectual property 
regimes. Indeed, some scholars explicitly analogize 
overlapping familial interests in genetic information to 
various forms of shared property.45 
Property is a flexible concept that may afford power 
to research participants, transforming them from 
mere research subjects into partners or shareholders 
who possess a measure of autonomy and control over 
the research enterprise, whereas a lack of property 
in their own bodies may leave persons vulnerable to 
abuse and exploitation. The controversy over the pub-
lication of the HeLa genome led to one type of creative 
approach to these problems. Following discussions, 
Henrietta Lacks’ family and the National Institutes 
of Health reached an innovative agreement to form 
the HeLa Genome Data Access Working Group, 
which is composed of researchers and two members 
of Lacks’ family. This group controls access to the 
HeLa genome; thus it could be viewed as investing 
limited property rights to shared genetic information 
in Henrietta Lacks’ family. The NIH has requested all 
researchers who generate or use genomic data from 
HeLa cells to include an acknowledgment of the 
contribution of Henrietta Lacks and the continued 
generosity of her family. According to the NIH, “the 
relationship between researchers and participants is 
evolving: seeking permission emphasizes that partici-
pants are partners, not just ‘subjects’”; thus this plan 
contemporary challenges in informed consent • fall 2016 443
Radhika Rao
reflects a “true partnership between the Lacks family 
and the biomedical research community.”46 
Similarly, controversy over the use of newborn 
blood samples in Michigan prompted the establish-
ment of the Michigan BioTrust for Health, pursuant 
to which the state’s citizens are granted a communal 
right to benefit from research using a valuable pub-
lic resource.47 Dried blood spots are collected from 
newborns under a mandatory public health program, 
but the state retains the blood samples indefinitely 
for research use. In 2008, the Michigan Department 
of Community Health created the Michigan BioTrust 
after convening a roundtable of experts to discuss the 
issues and determine policy. The roundtable deter-
mined that parental consent would be required, not for 
newborn screening itself, but for subsequent research 
use of the blood samples after October 1, 2010 (the 
Michigan Department of Community Health IRB 
granted a waiver of consent for blood samples that 
were already stored prior to May 1, 2010, based on 
the impracticability of obtaining consent for some 4 
million specimens dating back to 1984). The round-
table concluded that under Michigan law, the Michi-
gan Department of Community Health has “qualified 
ownership” of dried blood samples collected for new-
born screening; thus it is required to act as a fiduciary 
and exercise control over the biological specimens for 
the benefit of the child and the public. Accordingly, 
the Michigan BioTrust makes the blood samples avail-
able for research to benefit the public health, but not 
for research on non-medically useful cosmetic prod-
ucts. Moreover, the governing structure of the Michi-
gan BioTrust includes a Community Values Advisory 
Board to represent the citizens of Michigan regarding 
the types of research that would be deemed appropri-
ate by laypeople in the state. Thus, the state of Michi-
gan has actually built a biobank that is modeled upon 
the charitable trust, implementing the seminal schol-
arship of David Winickoff.48 The Michigan BioTrust 
imaginatively incorporates and reframes an ancient 
property mechanism — the trust — to provide a para-
digm for a biobank that treats the donors of biologi-
cal materials not just as objects of property or even 
subjects of human research, but rather as full-fledged 
partners and shareholders in the research enterprise.
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